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Abstract: A simple model of an open exchange economy with two commodities is used to investigate the relative merits
of small and large reforms: reforms are represented as movements in the relative price of the two commodities,
achieved by tightening or relaxing quotas. Three approaches, based on majority voting, the costs of compensation, and
social welfare, are used to compare the merits of small and large reforms. It is found that large reforms win more votes
than small reforms, whatever the direction of change: that the ration of marginal gross burden of compensation to
marginal net benefit is highest for small reforms: and that when distributional considerations are allowed to play a part,
the shape of the social welfare function is wholly indeterminate. In particular, local minima in social welfare cannot
be ruled out. 1
1 Introduction
Applied economists working on transitional economies are often faced by the following questions:
What are the relative merits of small and large reforms?  What are the merits of gradual and big-
bang reforms?  These question raise issues of limited information, political feasibility, administrative
costs, adjustment costs, and credibility, as well as the fundamental economic properties of the
equilibria before and after reform.  Versions of all these considerations can in practice be used to
advocate either large or small reforms. 
This paper uses a simple model to investigate the class of reforms which change a relative price in
the economy.  Issues of uncertainty, limited information, administrative and adjustment costs are
ignored in order to focus on the fundamental political and economic properties of small and large
reforms.  At this level of abstraction it might be expected that little can be said.  Not so: there are
some senses in which small reforms can be shown to be generally inferior to large reforms.
When a reform takes place, some people are hurt, and others benefit.  In response, people
substitute away from commodities or activities whose costs have risen.  This substitution makes
them less vulnerable to further reform.  In some cases, people begin to benefit from reforms which
initially hurt them.  This is a straightforward implication of the concavity of cost functions in prices.
This observation suggests that in some sense the benefits of reform should be convex.  This
intuition motivates the paper.
The paper identifies three precise senses which can be given to this intuition.  First, large reforms
win more votes than small reforms, whichever direction they are in. Secondly, for liberalisations,
the ratio of the marginal gross burden of compensation to the marginal net benefit of the reform
is maximised by small reforms.  It is even possible that the gross burden of compensation is falling
in the size of reform, though this will be unusual.  Thirdly, when distributional considerations are
introduced, nothing general can be said about the shape of the social welfare function in policy
instruments; in particular, local minima cannot be excluded, so that large and small reforms may
have effects of different signs.  It is not claimed that these results will generalise to all policy
contexts, but the simplicity of the model, which depends essentially on the shape of indirect utility
and cost functions, suggests that similar results are likely to apply wherever policy takes the form
of interventions in prices.2
The question explored in this paper has not been addressed, so far as I am aware, by existing
theory, perhaps because it is expected that the answer will be totally indeterminate.  Two recent
areas of public economics are relevant. One is the identification of global optima, (which may be
constrained in various ways), typically using first-order conditions such as the Ramsey rule for
commodity taxation or the Mirrlees rule for the non-linear income tax to characterise them.  A
second approach considers the marginal effects of changes outside equilibria.  Within the latter
category falls work on shadow prices for project appraisal, work on 'piecemeal' policy reform where
one dimension of a bundle of instruments is changed while holding the others fixed, and work on
'radial' reform where all instruments are moved proportionately.  Work on piecemeal and radial
trade reforms is consolidated in Neary (1995).  The motivation for this approach is clearly
summarised by Bruno (1972): "the government can use the tax system, or a process of institutional
change, to bring the market price system "closer" to the social optimum price, but is unable to do
so all at once, either because of very high adjustment costs, or because of political and institutional
constraints".  Bruno is thus assuming an answer to the question at issue here.  But the arguments
used by Bruno to motivate the analysis of small reforms can also be used to justify large reforms:
for instance, it is often argued that abolishing policy instruments is administratively easier, or more
credible (because harder to reverse) than adjusting them.  Explicit theoretical comparison of the
properties of small and large reforms therefore seems worthwhile.
The reforms considered in this paper are unidimensional.  It has long been familiar that the first-
order properties of simultaneous adjustments in two instruments might be quite different from the
properties of either reform in isolation.  In this paper only one policy instrument (a quota) is
available and the comparison is between large and small movements in this instrument.  
Much work using first-order conditions uses a representative consumer approach which ignores
income distribution.  In some cases this is a helpful simplification.  However, where second-order
conditions are being considered, it is potentially seriously misleading; it does not make much sense
to ignore distributional questions when the curvature of the utility function is precisely what is at
stake.  The paper therefore assumes an additive utilitarian approach, combined with concave utility,
which is a simple way of representing distributional concerns.  However, the analysis of social
welfare is prefaced by an analysis summing compensating variations across the population, which
ignores income distribution.  Only in the results on social welfare do the differences from previous
authors' results depend on the introduction of distributional considerations.ui (xi1,xi2)
ui1>0, ui2>0, ui11<0, ui22<0, ui11ui22>(ui12)2 for all i
p1xi1 % p2xi2 # p1Xi1 % p2Xi2
yi / p1Xi1 % p2Xi2
Mxij/Myi > 0, j ’ 1,2 for all i
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2 The Structure of the Model
I analyse a small open two-commodity exchange economy with one policy instrument, an import
quota, and no government.
2.1 Consumer Behaviour
There are two commodities, indexed 1 and 2.  Consumers, indexed by i, are endowed with
endowments X  and X , and voluntarily trade at prices exogenous to themselves; their actions 1 2




It is best, in what follows, to regard the concavity of the utility function as a statement about
society's preferences rather than a feature of behaviour, since neither risk nor intertemporal choice
are modelled.
(1) is maximised subject to the budget constraint:
(3)
It is useful to define wealth,   by the following: y,
(4)
It will be assumed throughout that both 1 and 2 are normal goods:
(5)
Note that this implies that uncompensated demand cures slope downwards.  Many of the paper's
results would also apply to inferior goods, but the presence of Giffen goods would completely
reverse the main results.  These problems yield a cost function c(p , p , u) and an indirect utility i 1 2
function v(p , p , y) of normal form.  Note that prices enter into the definition of y so that Roy's i 1 2
identity will be written in terms of total, not partial derivatives: and that a proportional increase in





























Subsequent analysis therefore examines the effects of changes in p , holding p  constant.   1 2
The cost function is increasing and convex in prices and the indirect utility function quasi-convex
in prices, holding y constant, for standard reasons (Varian 1984).  It is important to note that the i
indirect utility function is also quasi-convex in prices when the total derivative is considered so that
y is allowed to vary in response to p .  However, the convexity or concavity of the indirect utility i 1
function in prices is also of some interest.  We can see immediately, from revealed preference, that
if any set of relative prices is such as to induce autarchy on the part of an individual, it will minimise
that individual's welfare (because autarchy is a possible choice no matter what prices prevail).
Around such a point, therefore, if the utility function is continuous and smooth, it must be convex.
Away from this point, we use Roy's identity to investigate convexity.  Using total derivatives to
imply holding   and endowments constant but allowing y to vary, we differentiate Roy's identity p2
(6)
with respect to p .  After some manipulation this gives 1
(7)
The assumptions that both goods are normal and that utility is concave allow us to sign every part
of this expression.  The first term (including the minus sign) is unambiguously positive, as is the
whole expression at the point of autarchy.  The first term represents the effect emphasised in the
introduction, that people substitute away from x  as its price rises and hence reduce their 1
vulnerability.  The second term (including the minus sign) is positive for net buyers of commodity
1 but negative for net sellers; it represents the income effects of the change in prices on demand
and hence on the importance of commodity 1 in the consumer's budget.  The third term is
unambiguously negative outside autarchy, representing the fact that as people lose (gain) from the
change their marginal utility of income rises (falls).  
If the marginal utility of wealth were not diminishing, the whole expression would definitely be
positive for net buyers, for whom both income and substitution effects work together, and  would
be positive for net sellers if substitution effects outweigh income effects.  










The model is closed by international trade.  In the absence of policy intervention, it is assumed that
both commodities are traded at given world prices.  The model is then fully solved by solving every
consumer's maximisation problem (1) subject to the budget constraint (3).  Without loss of
generality, it will be assumed that commodity 1 is imported under free trade.  If economic policy
is used, it takes the form of a quota on the import of commodity 1:
(8)
We will assume that the quota binds.  Now p  and p  become endogenous.  We lose no generality, 1 2
however, by holding p  fixed and allowing p  to vary.  Now the model is solved by making p 2 1 1
endogenous and adding the equation
(9)
Because demand curves slope downwards and domestic supplies are exogenous, the economy's
demand for imports of commodity 1 is a negative function of their price.  We can therefore
equally well think of the authorities choosing a price p , and this is how the policy will be 1
represented in what follows.  However, the price must lie between the autarchy price, where
imports are zero, which will be written p , and the free-trade price, p .  A reform is defined as
A F
1 1
a change in policy, i.e.  either an increase or a reduction in p  within this interval.  In what follows 1
this will be termed the 'feasible range'.  Equally, imports of commodity 1 must lie between zero
and the free-trade level.
3 Comparing Small and Large Reforms
This section explores the comparative properties of small and large reforms in the model, using
criteria based on majority voting, on compensation, and on social welfare.  
Reforms take the form of moving from the old price, p , to the new price, p .  It is convenient
O N
1 1
to define two prices for the consumer: p' , which is the price at which the individual is in autarchy, i1
and p* , which is defined by  i1
(10)










indifferent to the reform.  For each individual i, given p , there will be at most one value of p*
O
1 i1
(because of the quasi-convexity of the indirect utility function) and p'  (because demand curves i1
slope downwards).  If p*  exists, so must p' , and p'  must lie between p  and p* .  Note that the i1 i1 i1 1 i1
O
value of p* , but not of p' , depends on p .  I term an individual a 'beneficiary' if they gain overall i1 i1 1
O
from the reform, i.e.
(11)
and I say that individuals 'cross over' if p'  lies between p  and p , so that the reform causes the i1
O1 N1
consumer to switch from being a net seller to being a net buyer of one commodity.  I make no
assumption about the form of the distribution of p*  or p'  across individuals.   1 1
3.1 Majority Voting
Assume that voting is determined by self-interested preferences, using the indirect utility function
developed above.  The quasi-convexity of this function implies single-troughed preferences.  Like
single-peaked preferences, these eliminate the possibility of cycles in voting over possible sets of
relative prices: they do so, however, by encouraging extreme positions rather than compromise.
In the terms of Sen (1970), these preferences satisfy the 'Value Restriction' because alternatives in
the middle are not considered best by anyone.
Consider now liberalisation, which reduces p .  There are four possible cases for each individual: 1
(Case i) p' > p , or p'  does not exist and x  > X  for all values of p . i1 1 i1 i1 i1 1
O
In this case the individual is a net buyer of commodity 1 before and after the reform and supports
the liberalisation, whatever its size.
(Case ii) p  > p >p' , or p'  does not exist and X  > x  for all p .
O N
1 1 i1 i1 i1 i1 1
Here the individual was a net seller of commodity 1 both before and after the reform, and opposes
the reform.
(Case iii) p  >p'  > p  > p* .
O N
1 i1 1 i17
Here the individual has become a net buyer, but remains a loser from the reform and will oppose
it.  
(Case iv)  p  >p'   > p*  > p .
O N1
1 i1 i1
In this case, the individual has become a net buyer and a beneficiary of the reform.
Inspection of the inequalities in (i) to (iv) shows that as the price falls, people in category (i) remain
there, but some people move from category (ii) to (iii) and some from category (iii) to category (iv).
The first transition makes no difference to their vote; the second transition, however, changes them
from opponents to supporters of the reform.  Hence the number of supporters of liberalisation
is increasing in the size of the liberalisation.  An exactly symmetrical argument shows that the
number of supporters of increased restrictions is increasing in the magnitude of the tightening.
Proposition 1: More people will support a large reform than a small one, whatever the direction of the
change.  
The properties of the indirect utility function allow us also to say that: 
Proposition 2: Within the feasible range of prices, each individual will prefer either the free market price
or the autarchy price to all others.  
This follows from the quasi-convexity of the indirect utility functions, which rules out interior
maxima.  It follows immediately that:
Proposition 3: For one of p  and p , movement to this price will win a majority vote over any other
F A
1 1
alternative policy, starting from any price in the feasible range.
Finally, it is worth noting that opponents of a particular reform will be divided between those who
lose both in total and at the margin, and those who lose in total but gain at the margin.  This
suggests some likelihood that opposition to reforms can easily disintegrate, depending on the way
that agendas are set (developing this point formally would require specifying more structure in the

















by giving away some of their endowment to others in order to win these others onto their side; this
arises because there is a catastrophic change in welfare when the policy switches from one extreme
to the other.  
It should be noted that the results of this section depend on people crossing over between different
sides of the market.  By contrast, the results of the next section depend only on  the presence of
substitution effects.
3.2 Compensation and Net Benefit
This section considers the virtues of small and large reforms from the point of view of
compensation.  There are two reasons for using this approach.  The first is that the relation
between compensation and benefit gives some sense of the political feasibility of a reform.  I
represent this by considering the ratio of net benefit to gross burden of compensation of the
reform.  The second reason is that summing compensating variations is equivalent to examining
social welfare under the assumption that income going to different individuals is valued equally at
the margin.  This allows easy comparison with the results of other authors on marginal reforms,
most of whom have used representative-consumer approaches.
The measures used here are based on the compensating variation, which is the amount which would
have to be paid to a consumer at the new prices to restore their former utility.  Note that using the
nominal compensating variation in the present model is equivalent to measuring the compensating
benefit in units of commodity 2.  Define the net benefit (NB) of the reform as minus the sum of
the compensating variations, positive or negative, across individuals:
(12)
where N indexes the new equilibrium and O the old, and p  is the vector p , p ).  Define the gross N 1 2
N
burden (GB) of the reform as the sum of compensating variations over positive instances only.
This is the amount that would have to be paid to losers if they were paid sufficiency compensation
to make them indifferent to the situations before and after reform:
(13)















functions obviously pass through 0 at p .  The behaviour of the net burden is unambiguous;
O
1
differentiation of (12) immediately shows it to be falling where commodity 1 is imported, and
convex in the price.  
(14)
Within the feasible range of prices, therefore, the first derivative is negative except at the point of
autarchy.  Since liberalisation involves reducing p , this is a case of the general result (Neary, 1995) 1
that a proportionate reduction in all trade distortions increases welfare where income distribution
is ignored.
The behaviour of the gross burden as p  changes is harder to establish, because it is the sum of a 1
diminishing set of elements.  I assume here that there is a finite number of individuals rather than
a continuum (general results for the continuum would require integrating over all the dimensions
in which individuals can differ, and unless preferences are further restricted there are infinitely many
dimensions to be considered).
Consider a liberalisation, which reduces the price of p .  In the neighbourhood of no reform, (13) 1
is a summation over all net sellers.  However, away from p , it is a summation over net buyers and
O
1
those who have become net buyers but for whom either p'  > p  > p*  or p*  does not exist. i1 1 i1 i1
N
These people leave the summation at the point where p  = p* .  In differentiating (13), we need
N
1 i1
to take account of the people who are leaving the summation at any point.  
Where p*  = p , the compensating variation is zero by definition.  Hence the departure of these i1 1
N
people from the summation does not affect the value of the sum at that point.  The gross burden
is therefore continuous in prices.  At a point where p*  = p  for no individual i, we can simply i1 1
N
differentiate (13) to get 
(15)
Initially, this must be positive, but later when most of the individuals in the summation observe p'i110
> p , it can become negative.  Indeed, if all individuals eventually become buyers (as is possible
N
1
under free trade), the first derivative must become negative.  The second derivative of (13) is clearly
negative; again, this can be taken only when  p*  = p  for no individual i.   i1 1
N
Let p^  be a point a point where p*  = p  for some i.  Here the derivative does not exist and there 1 i1 1
N
is a kink in the curve.  We can see that where p  lies above this point, the first derivative (15)
N
includes some who are net buyers who leave the summation at p^   and are not included for p 1 1
N
< p^  below this point.  Since for them the gross burden is increasing in price (and falling in the 1
direction of liberalisation), their inclusion in the summation increases the value of (15); hence (15)
is higher for p  immediately above p^  than for p  immediately below it.  We see, therefore, that
N N
1 1 1
the gross burden takes the form of a continuous function of p  with concave sections punctuated
1
by convex kinks.  Note, finally, that the first derivative is maximised where p  = p ; this follows
N O
1 1
from the fact that (15) is a summation of elements which are all positive at p  and which are falling
O
1
in p, and that no new element joins the summation as the price falls.  The shape of the two
functions is now shown in Figure 1.
The derivation of the shape of these two functions leads immediately to three propositions of
interest:
Proposition 4: For small liberalisations, the gross burden in terms of commodity 2 is increasing in the
size of the liberalisation, but this need not be true for large liberalisations.
Proposition 5: A marginal liberalisation at the point of autarchy gives no net benefit, but finite
liberalisations at this point give positive net benefit
Proposition 6: The absolute value  of the ratio of the marginal increase in the burden of compensation
to the marginal increase in net benefit is maximised at the point of no reform.
The first two of these propositions are simply a restatement of the properties of the functions
derived above: the second follows directly from the convexity of the net benefit and the fact that
the first derivative of the gross burden is maximised at p .  Global statements about the relation
O
1
between net benefit and gross burden require more specific assumptions about the distributions
of p*  across consumers, and about the shape of the demand curve.  But proposition 6 gives a clear i1







































Finally, I consider the alternatives of achieving the same reform by a sequence of two small reforms,
or by one big reform.  The net benefits generated by these two processes are not formally identical,
because different prices are used to make the comparisons, but it is clear that the utility gain
achieved is exactly equal.  In the case of gross burden, exactly the same pricing issue arises, but the
summation in the case of the incremental process includes elements which are omitted from the
one-stage process.
We can show this by considering a linear approximation.  A first-order approximation to the
compensating variation for the individual i is 
(16)
for the one-stage process and 
(17)
where   indexes the intermediate stage, for the incremental stage.  These are equal.  The gross M
burden, for the one-stage case, is simply (16) if it is positive and zero otherwise.  For the
incremental process, it will be the sum of the positive elements of (17).  It is easy to see that if both
elements have the same sign, this will be the same as (17); however, if one element is positive and
one negative, it will be smaller.  Hence we get:
Proposition 7: to a first-order approximation, an incremental reform with compensation at each stage
imposes a higher gross burden than a one-step reform for the same benefit
Whether proposition 7 matters depends to some extent on whether people require compensation
at each stage ; this is likely to depend partly on their expectations about the future path of reform
and partly on liquidity constraints.  But it raises grave doubts about any conception that incremental
reforms are in general easier than big-bang ones.Eivi(p1,p2,yi)
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3.3 Social Welfare
The results of the previous section neglected income distribution.  Since we are specifically
concerned with second derivatives in this paper, it is important to include distributional effects.  I
assume that the authorities are additively utilitarian; social welfare is given by 
(18)
This is just the summation of the indirect utility function over the interval between free-trade prices
and autarchy.  Other prices are incompatible with market clearing.  The form of social welfare is
not particularly restrictive in the present context of single-period certainty, because the
cardinalisation of the utility function can be chosen (as was noted in Section 2) to incorporate the
distributional considerations of the policy maker.  We therefore need only to consider the
properties of the summation of the function analysed in Section 3.1.
If there were no distributional considerations, the previous section's arguments show that welfare
is maximised over the interval p  to p  at the free-trade price.  However, including distributional
A F
considerations, the maximum may be elsewhere.  In particular, although the indirect utility functions
have no interior maximum, this need not be true of their summation.  For example, assume that
there are just two kinds of individuals, one endowed only with commodity 1, the other endowed
only with commodity 2, and that preferences are Leontief.  In this case there are no efficiency gains
from liberalisation: the only effect is an income transfer from those endowed with commodity 1
to those endowed with commodity 2.  Welfare will then be maximised at the point where the
marginal utility of income is equal for the two groups, and there is no reason why this should not
lie in the feasible range.
It might seem that the existence of global minima of the indirect utility function guaranteed a
minimum for the social welfare function.  However, it can be shown that unless all individuals have
the same p ', there must be some individual for whom p' >p .  If this were not the case, then at 1 1 1
A
p  there would be no individual for whom x  > X , and the market would not clear, which violates
A1
i1 i1
the assumptions of the model.  Hence the global minimum of some individual's indirect utility must
lie outside the feasible range, and there is no guarantee that the social welfare function will have an
interior minimum within the feasible range.  Moreover, as in the previous example, it is possible that13
some individuals will not cross over at any price.
Interior minima for the social welfare function, however, are perfectly possible.  Consider, for
instance, the case where a large number of agents cross over between being net buyers and net
sellers at roughly the same point within the feasible range for prices: and assume that these agents
are relatively poor and that distributional considerations are important, i.e.  that dv/dy is i i
particularly large for these individuals.  In this case it become very likely that there will be a local
minimum somewhere near the point where the individuals cross over, because the value of dv/dp i 1
will shift dramatically from positive to negative for these individuals.  
Proposition 8: The social welfare function may exhibit local minima and local maxima: nothing general
can be said about its shape.
If the indirect utility function is convex, as is guaranteed if (7) is positive, the social welfare function
is a summation of convex functions, and is itself convex.  However, this is only of limited interest
because the reform might equally well be measured by the magnitude of the quota, and the relation
between the quota and the price depends on the shape of the demand curve.  
If we impose the assumption that there is no crossing-over, we eliminate the possibility of local
minima in indirect utility functions.  However, social welfare may still have a local minimum.  The
phenomenon of crossing-over and the resultant local minima in indirect utility functions do,
however, make local minima in social welfare more likely, and hence increase the difficulty of policy
design.
4 Conclusions
In this section I consider the scope of the results, and some possible extensions.  The essential
feature of the model is that it exploits the curvature of individual cost functions; similar results are
likely to be found in any policy context which  affects welfare by changing prices.  In particular, it
should be noted that the concavity of cost functions is a feature of production as well as
consumption.  The results will not apply to other forms of reforms such as institutional changes
or changes in property rights unless these can be expressed as changes in relative prices.14
One restriction on the generality of the results is that some of them involve the phenomenon of
crossing-over: in particular, this is true of the results on majority-voting, but not of most of the
other results in the paper.  In some economies, crossing-over is a very important phenomenon.
For instance, poor households in some economies will sell food in good years but buy it in bad
years.  Admittedly, this is most often the consequence of output shocks rather than price response,
but it does suggest that crossing-over may need to be considered in examining the policy effects
of intervention in food markets in these economies.
Another limitation of the results is that the existence of interior maxima or minima in the social
welfare function depends on distributional considerations.  But the results on majority voting and
on the ratio between compensation and benefit are not affected by the view taken of income
distribution.
A natural extension would be to consider the presence of sunk costs.  For instance, the response
of the economy to major changes in energy prices is well known to be a matter of adjusting the type
of capital equipment used in production.  The presence of irreversible investment of this kind tends
to intensify the attraction of extremes; not only will the two extremes of policy be more important
than the middle ground, but there will be an element of hysteresis in the choice between the
extremes.  The stickiness of energy prices in the former Soviet Union might reflect this problem.
Another natural extension is to the effects of multidimensional policy change.  The idea that
movement in several instruments might jointly produce Pareto improvement where there is no
single instrument which can produce a Pareto-improvement is not new, and is very similar the
results shown here in Section 3.2.  Logrolling exploits this possibility.  However, the one-
dimensional case does not raise the possibilities of cyclic majority preferences which can easily
emerge in two dimensions (and are closely related to logrolling, see Mueller 1989).  Introducing
more than one commodity into the model would also allow explicit consideration of general-
equilibrium effects.
Clearly, there is much more to be said about the relative merits of large and small reform, including
the role of limited information and administrative costs.  Investigation of these factors, however,
requires more specific modelling of political and administrative processes than has been attempted
here.15
The more general lesson of this paper is that to ignore the presence of substitution effects, and to
concentrate on first derivatives, tends to overstate the obstacles to reforms and may induce
unwarranted caution.  However, it should also be borne in mind that possibilities for substitution
tend to be positively related to education and income.  In this sense, the poor are likely to be the
most vulnerable to the consequences of policy change.  Moreover, where there are costs of trade,
we may observe a number of people who withdraw from the market over a finite range of prices.
Most evidence from poor economies suggests that these are often among the poorest people; they
are also the least affected by price reforms, at least marginal ones.  The distributional consequences
of price changes for people who trade in the market only in extreme circumstances are worthy of
study, but lie outside the scope of this paper.16
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